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New York's Unconstitutional Tax on the Internet:
Amazon. com v. New York State Department of Taxation &
Finance and the Dormant Commerce Clause*

INTRODUCTION

As the current economic downturn continues to ripple through
every sector of the economy, state governments from North Carolina
to California are struggling to develop innovative tax policies to boost
their plummeting revenues.' Traditional methods of taxation are no
longer sufficient to satisfy State expenditures-either government
spending must change drastically' or legislatures must approve new
taxes to bolster falling revenues.' The recent "Amazon tax" passed by
the New York State Assembly4 is a prime example of the latter. The
tax requires out-of-state retailers-such as Amazon.com, Inc.
("Amazon.com"
or "Amazon")
and Overstock.com,
Inc.
5
("Overstock.com")-to collect a use tax from in-state consumers if
* © 2010 Daniel Tyler Cowan.
1. See Kevin Kiley, Lawmakers May Slap Sales Tax on Services, NEWS & OBSERVER
(Raleigh, N.C.), June 23, 2009, at 1A (considering the expansion of the sales tax to various
commonplace services); Loren Bendele, California's Proposed "Amazon Tax"-A
Destructive Solution, VENTURE BEAT, Apr. 24, 2009, http://venturebeat.com/2009/04/24/
california's-proposed-"amazon-tax-bad-for-california/ (proposing a tax on Web-based
business advertising).
2. See Mitch Daniels, Opinion, The Coming Reset in State Government, WALL ST. J.,
Sept. 3, 2009, at A17 (pointing out that decreased state tax revenues virtually mandate a
reduction in "the size and scope of... state governments").
3. Id.; Conor Dougherty, Falling Tax Revenues Slam States, WALL ST. J., Sept. 30,
2009, at A4 ("State tax revenues in the second quarter plunged 17% from a year earlier as
rising unemployment and reduced spending hurt sales- and income-tax collections .... ").
4. See N.Y. TAX LAW § 1101(b)(8)(vi) (McKinney Supp. 2010) (expanding the
definition of a vendor for sales tax purposes); see also Kenneth Corbin, 'Amazon Tax'
Lands in New York, INTERNETNEWS.COM, Apr. 10, 2008, http://www.internetnews.com/
government/article.php/3740056/Amazon+Tax+Lands+in+New+York.htm ("The so-called
'Amazon tax' closes a loophole for Internet retailers who derive sales through affiliate
programs in which Web site owners place a link to the merchant on their site and earn a
commission on sales made from referrals.").
5. This Recent Development uses the terms "use tax" and "sales tax"
interchangeably. While a use tax is "technically levied" on the individual,most states try to
force the company to collect and remit the tax since the individual avoids paying sales tax
on the item. Adam L. Schwartz, Note, Nexus or Not? Orvis v. New York, SFA Folio v.
Tracy and the Persistent Confusion over Quill, 29 CONN. L. REV. 485, 491-92 (1996); see
also Megan E. Groves, Note, Where There's a Will, There's a Way: State Sales and Use
Taxation of Electronic Commerce, 74 IND. L.J. 293, 308 (1998) ("Collection of use taxes
serves to prevent sales tax evasion by out-of-state buyers, to adjust between local and
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the retailers have marketing affiliates in the state which produce at

least $10,000 in sales.6 No fewer than sixteen other states have
considered passing a similar tax.7
In Quill Corp. v. North Dakota,' however, the United States
Supreme Court held that, under the Commerce Clause of the

Constitution,9 a State cannot require an out-of-state retailer to collect
and remit a use tax unless the retailer has a "substantial nexus" with
the taxing state.1" The Court invalidated a sales tax imposed by North
Dakota on an out-of-state mail-order retailer, which had no offices or
employees in the state." By invalidating this tax, the Court reaffirmed
the bright-line rule of National Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Department of
Revenue of Illinois2 that "a vendor whose only contacts with the

taxing State are by mail or common carrier lacks the 'substantial
nexus' required by the Commerce Clause;" in other words, some
physical presence is required.14 Attempts by New York and other

states to create statutorily this substantial nexus between out-of-state
Internet retailers and the taxing state through the retailers' marketing
affiliates 5 run afoul of Quill and its bright-line rule.
Part I of this Recent Development examines States' ability to tax
out-of-state retailers and the history of New York's Amazon tax. Part

II discusses the Supreme Court's decision in Quill and the
interstate businesses, and to prevent interstate discrimination."). Thus, in practice, either
tax will be collected and remitted by the retailer but imposed on the individual. See
Schwartz, supra, at 491-92. Furthermore, a use tax is intended to "level the playing field"
among in-state and out-of-state retailers. See 68 AM. JUR. 2D Sales & Use Taxes § 167
(1973) ("A use tax is designed to protect a state's revenues by taking away the advantages
to residents of traveling out of state to make untaxed purchases, and to protect local
merchants from out-of-state competition which, because of its lower or nonexistent tax
burdens, can offer lower prices. It is designed to preclude the avoidance of sales tax. The
imposition of a use tax allows a state to collect the same amount regardless of where
property is purchased.").
6. § 1101(b)(8)(vi). "Affiliate marketing involves entities or individuals that derive
income by directing 'traffic' to various Internet Web sites through different marketing
methods including e-mail, banner, and pop-up advertising .
Roger Colaizzi, A
Discussion of Internet-Related Trademark Cases and Trademark Fraud, in RECENT
TRENDS IN TRADEMARK PROTECTION: A DISCUSSION OF INTERNET-RELATED
TRADEMARK CASES AND TRADEMARK FRAUD (2009) 41,49-50.

7. See infra notes 41-56 and accompanying text.
8. 504 U.S. 298 (1992).
9. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3.
10. Quill, 504 U.S. at 311.
11. Id. at 301-02.
12. 386 U.S. 753 (1967), overruled in part by Quill, 504 U.S. 298.
13. Quill, 504 U.S. at 311; see Bellas Hess, 386 U.S. at 758-60.
14. Quill, 504 U.S. at 315 (arguing that "a small sales force, plant, or office" is
necessary to satisfy the physical presence requirement).
15. See infra notes 40-56 and accompanying text.
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constitutional requirements for taxing out-of-state retailers. In Part
III, this Recent Development analyzes the recent New York County
Civil Supreme Court16 decision, Amazon.com v. New York State
Department of Taxation & Finance,7 which upholds the

constitutionality of the tax. The focus in Part III is on Amazon's
dormant Commerce Clause argument and the trial court's application
of the Supreme Court's decision in Quill. This Recent Development
argues that the New York trial court failed to apply Quill's substantial

nexus test properly and exaggerated the role of Amazon's
associates. 18 As a result, the trial court incorrectly held that the tax on
Amazon did not violate the Commerce Clause. 9 When applied
correctly, the Quill decision should invalidate New York's tax on

Amazon and similar out-of-state Internet retailers. Finally, Part IV of
this Recent Development examines the continuing vitality of Quill in
today's technologically driven economy and proposes two solutions to

the problem of uniformly taxing out-of-state Internet retailers.
I. THE SALES AND USE TAX AND THE COMMERCE CLAUSE

State legislatures have tried for decades to impose sales and use

taxes on out-of-state retailers, particularly mail-order companies.20
Whether called a sales tax or a use tax, the practical implication of
these taxes is the same: out-of-state retailers that sell goods to

residents within the taxing state must collect and remit the tax to the
taxing state.2'

16. The New York County Civil Supreme Court is New York's district or trial court.
See Quintin Johnstone, New York State Courts: Their Structure, Administration and
Reform Possibilities,43 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 915, 916 (2000).
17. 877 N.Y.S.2d 842 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2009).
18. Id. at 845; see also Brief for Tax Foundation as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Plaintiffs-Appellants at 9, Amazon.corn v. N.Y. State Dep't of Taxation & Fin., No.
601247/08 (N.Y. App. Div. filed Sept. 9, 2009) (arguing that the trial court "confused
elements from the two separate tests for substantial nexus").
19. Amazon.com, 877 N.Y.S.2d at 849 ("Amazon's first cause of action for declaratory
relief based on violation of the Commerce Clause is therefore dismissed.").
20. See JOHN F. DUE & JOHN L. MIKESELL, SALES TAXATION: STATE AND LOCAL

STRUCTURE AND ADMINISTRATION 252 (2d ed. 1994); Christina T. Le, Comment, The
Honeymoon's Over: States Crack Down on the Virtual World's Tax-Free Love Affair with
E-Commerce, 7 HOUS. Bus. & TAX L.J. 395, 401 (2007). Even after Quill, states continue
to tax mail-order companies that satisfy Quill's substantial nexus requirement. See, e.g.,
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-164.8(b) (2009) (imposing an obligation on retailers who make
mail-order sales to collect and remit taxes).
21. For example, if Delaware imposes a 5% sales and use tax on all out-of-state
retailers, any time an out-of-state retailer makes a sale to a Delaware resident, the retailer
must collect the 5% sales and use tax from the consumer and remit it to Delaware.

1426

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 88

New York was the first state to attempt to satisfy statutorily the
substantial nexus requirement of Quill with the passage of its
Amazon tax. Then-Governor Eliot Spitzer originally proposed the tax
in November 2007,22 but tabled it shortly thereafter-perhaps over
fears of legal challenges to the policy.23 However, the tax was
reconsidered in early 2008 and included in the State's budget, despite
Amazon's intensive lobbying efforts. 24 The New York State Assembly
approved the tax on April 9, 2008,25 and it took effect on June 1,

2008.26 The new tax expands the definition of a vendor for sales and
use tax purposes. 7 Under the new definition,

a person making sales of tangible personal property.., shall be
presumed to be soliciting business through an independent
contractor or other representative if the seller enters into an
agreement with a resident of this state under which the
resident, for a commission or other consideration, directly or
indirectly refers potential customers, whether by a link on an
internet website or otherwise, to the seller ....
2
22. Joseph Goldstein, Spitzer's Christmas Tax Surprise, N.Y. SUN, Nov. 14, 2007,
http://www.nysun.com/new-york/spitzers-christmas-tax-surprise/66382/.
23. See Kenneth Corbin, New York's About-Face on E-Commerce Taxation,
INTERNETNEWS.COM,

Nov.

14,

2007,

http://www.internetnews.com/bus-news/

article.php/3711236 ("Spitzer's move could have come from fears that the policy would
have run afoul of the 1992 U.S. Supreme Court ruling in Quill Corporation v. North
Dakota...."); Jacob Gershman, Spitzer Abandons Amazon Tax, N.Y. SUN, Nov. 15, 2007,
http://www.nysun.com/new-york/spitzer-abandons-amazon-tax/66465/ (suggesting online
retailers may challenge "the state's interpretation of its sales tax nexus laws" which govern
whether the retailers must collect local taxes). The original Amazon tax was proposed
simply as a clarification to current tax policy by memorandum of the New York
Department of Taxation and Finance, but the memorandum was quickly withdrawn. See
N.Y. Dep't of Taxation & Fin. Mem. TSB-M-07(6)S (Nov. 9, 2007), available at 2007 WL
3390905, withdrawn TSB-M-07(6.1)S (Nov. 15, 2007), available at http://www.tax.state
.ny.us/pdf/memos/sales/m07 6 1s.pdf.
24. See Kenneth Corbin, Amazon Doesn't Love New York Tax Plan,
INTERNETNEWS.COM,

Feb. 13,

2008, http://www.internetnews.com/ec-news/article

.php/3727991/Amazon+Doesnt+Love+New+York+Tax+Plan.htm. Then-Governor Spitzer
estimated that the tax would increase state revenue by $120 million over the next two
years. Id.
25. See New York Legislative Information, http://public.leginfo.state.ny.us/
menugetf.cgi (enter "S6807-C"; then select "2008"; then select "Search") (last visited Apr.
14, 2010); Jeremy W. Peters, LegislatorsBack Spending Rise in State's Budget, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 10, 2008, at Al (discussing the new tax for online retailers).
26. See Act of April 9, 2008, 2008 N.Y. Laws 2704, 2844 pt. 00-1; Michael Santo,
"Amazon Tax" Begins Tomorrow; Goodbye to the Sales Tax-Free Internet?, REAL TECH
NEWS, May 31, 2008, http://www.realtechnews.com/2008/05/31/amazon-tax-beginstomorrow-goodbye-to-the-sales-tax-free-internet/.
27. N.Y. TAX LAW § 1101(b)(8)(vi) (McKinney Supp. 2010).
28. Id. For a more detailed explanation of performance-based marketing, see infra
notes 93-98 and accompanying text.
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This expanded definition encompasses Amazon and other outof-state Internet retailers by attempting to create a substantial nexus
with New York based on their marketing affiliates located in the
state. As the New York trial court explained: "The CommissionAgreement Provision thus requires collection of New York taxes
from New Yorkers by out-of-state sellers that contractually agree to
pay commissions to New York residents referring potential customers
to them, provided that more than $10,000 was generated from such
New York referrals during the preceding four quarterly periods."'2 9
Legislators and business leaders in New York claimed that this tax
would put in-state retailers on a level playing field with out-of-state
Internet retailers.3 °
Initially, the Supreme Court's interpretation of the Commerce
Clause swept broadly and declared "no State has the right to lay a tax
on interstate commerce in any form,"'" thus preventing States from
imposing any sales and use taxes on out-of-state retailers. Over time,
however, the Supreme Court's Commerce Clause jurisprudence has
become more accommodating to States wishing to tax out-of-state
retailers.32 In two seminal cases, Bellas Hess and Quill, the Supreme
Court held that out-of-state retailers may be subject to a sales and use
tax if they have a substantial nexus with the taxing state: "a vendor
whose only contacts with the taxing State are by mail or common
carrier lacks the 'substantial nexus' required by the Commerce
33
Clause. ,
29. Amazon.com v. N.Y. State Dep't of Taxation & Fin., 877 N.Y.S.2d 842, 846 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 2009).
30. Corbin, supra note 4.
31. Leloup v. Port of Mobile, 127 U.S. 640, 648 (1888); see also Jennifer L. Larsen,
Comment, Discrimination in the Dormant Commerce Clause, 49 S.D. L. REV. 844, 845
(2004) ("The negative aspect of the Commerce Clause, the dormant Commerce Clause,
'directly limits the power of the States to discriminate against interstate commerce.' The
doctrine thus prevents states from establishing regulations that discriminate or impose an
undue burden on interstate commerce." (quoting Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 U.S. 437,
454 (1992))).
32. Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 310 (1992) ("Complete Auto
emphasized the importance of looking past 'the formal language of the tax statute [to] its
practical effect.'" (quoting Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 279
(1977))); see also Schwartz, supra note 5, at 485 ("A state can require out-of-state
companies doing business via mail order to collect and remit a use tax on goods that the
company sells into the state."); Carol Schultz Vento, Annotation, Sufficient Nexus for State
to Require Foreign Entity to Collect State's Compensating, Sales, or Use Tax-PostComplete Auto Transit Cases, 71 A.L.R. 5th 671, 671 (1999) ("The validity of a tax
imposed by a state on an out-of-state entity is determined by, among other factors,
whether the taxpayer's activity has a sufficient nexus or connection with the state.").
33. Quill, 504 U.S. at 311; Nat'l Bellas Hess v. Dep't of Revenue, 386 U.S. 753, 758
(1966), overruled in part by Quill, 504 U.S. 298; see also Schwartz, supra note 5, at 485
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substantial nexus when dealing with Internet retailers.' 4 Internet
retailers have a huge virtual presence throughout the entire United
States,35 yet their headquarters and workforce typically are located in
only one state.36 Since these Internet retailers have a physical

presence in only one or two states, legislatures in the remaining states
have had a difficult time creating the requisite substantial nexus to
impose a sales and use tax.37 While States try to enforce a use tax

directly on their residents,38 most citizens fail to self-report their outof-state purchases. Consequently, States are unable to realize a large
amount of tax revenue from Internet transactions.39
("[Bellas Hess and Quill] require some nexus between a company and the taxing state
above and beyond the common carrieris] such as phones, roads, and the mails which
provide merely the simple links by which commerce takes place." (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
34. See Julie M. Buechler, Note, Virtual Reality: Quill's "Physical Presence"
Requirement Obsolete when Cogitating Use Tax Collection in Cyberspace, 74 N.D. L. REV.
479, 479-80, 483 (1998). As a result, many state courts have attempted to circumvent or
minimize the scope of the Quill holding. See Mark Alan McGinnis, Comment, Marching to
the Beat of the Itinerant Drummer: States Increasingly Refuse to Get Physical Before
Finding Nexus, 32 CAP. U. L. REV. 149, 199-200 (2003).
35. See Carl Bialik, Numbers Show China Beats U.S. in Net Use, but Which Numbers?,
WALL ST. J., Mar. 28, 2008, at B1 (specifying that in 2007 the United States had over two
hundred million Internet users and "71% of heads of households use[d] the Internet").
36. For example, Amazon.com is headquartered in Seattle, Washington. See
AMAZON.COM, INC., 2008 AMAZON.COM ANNUAL REPORT 3 (2009), available at
http://phx.corporate-ir.net/External.File?item=UGFyZW50SUQ9MjAyN3xDaGlsZEIEP
SOxfFR5cGU9Mw==&t=1. eBay is headquartered in San Jose, California. See EBAY INC.,
2007 EBAY INC. ANNUAL REPORT 1 (2007), available at http://files.shareholder.com/
downloads/ebay/839786756x0x192977/08EAA22C-C31C-41AD-B4D3-0A954354566F/
ar2007.pdf. And Overstock.com is headquartered in Salt Lake City, Utah. See
Overstock.com, Who We Are, http://www.overstock.com/about (last visited Apr. 14,
2010).
37. See Wendy Trahan, The Future of Sales and Use Tax on Electronic Commerce:
Promoting Uniformity After Quill, 21 VA. TAX REV. 101, 107 (2001); Seth Cooper &
Jonathan Williams, An Unconstitutional Interstate Sales Tax, FORBES, May 14, 2008,
http://www.forbes.com/2008/05/13/amazonlaw-states-rights-oped-cx-scjw
_0514amazonlaw.html. Compare this situation to Apple, Inc. As Apple opens more retail
stores throughout the country, residents in these states are required to pay sales tax on
their purchases, even if the purchases are made online. In other words, Apple has a
substantial nexus with every state in which it opens a retail store. See Trahan, supra, at
113-14 (citing Michael J. McIntyre, Commentary, Taxing Electronic Commerce Fairly and
Efficiently, 52 TAX L. REV. 625, 640-41 (1997)); Andrew B. Lustigman, Amazon, or
Online, Tax Will Hurt Small Businesses, The Lustigman Firm, Feb. 12, 2004,
http://www.lfirm.com/CM/Publications-Internet/small-business.asp. See generally Borders
Online, LLC v. State Bd. of Equalization, 29 Cal. Rptr. 3d 176 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005)
(holding that there was a substantial nexus between the state and Borders Online).
38. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 105-164.6(b), 105-164.16(d) (2009).
39. See Groves, supra note 5, at 310; see also John C. Blase & John W. Westmoreland,
Quill Has Been Plucked! MTC Sales Are Slowly Eroding the Substantial Nexus Standard,
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As a result, States have recently begun to experiment with new
ways to satisfy statutorily the substantial nexus requirement and force
out-of-state Internet retailers to collect taxes from their customers.
New York was the first state in the country to impose a sales and use
tax on Internet companies such as Amazon.com and Overstock.com
by attempting to create a substantial nexus based on the companies'
marketing affiliates living and working in New York.' At present, no
fewer than sixteen other states either have considered passing or have
passed the so-called Amazon tax: California,4
Colorado,42
Connecticut,43 Hawaii,' Illinois,4" Iowa, 46 Maryland,47 Minnesota, 4
Mississippi, 49 New Mexico, 0 North Carolina,5 Rhode Island, 2
Tennessee,53 Vermont, 4 Virginia,55 and Wisconsin. 6 Despite these

73 N.D. L. REV. 685, 685 (1997) ("[T]he use tax is normally self-assessed (i.e., voluntarily
paid to the state by the purchaser), and the purchaser is primarily responsible for paying
the tax.").
40. See N.Y. TAX LAW § 1101(b)(8)(vi) (McKinney Supp. 2010).
41. See Assem. 178, 2009-10 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2009). Debate on the bill has been
postponed for one year. See Bendele, supra note 1.
42. See 2010 Colo. Sess. Laws 54, 54-55.
43. See S. 806, 2009 Gen. Assem., Jan. Sess. (Conn. 2009).
44. See H. 1405, 25th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Haw. 2009). Although the Hawaii Legislature
passed the bill, Hawaiian Governor Linda Lingle vetoed it. See Mike Sachoff, Hawaii
Governor Vetoes Amazon Tax Law, WEB PRO NEWS, July 2, 2009,
http://www.webpronews.com/topnews/2009/07/02/hawaii-governor-vetoes-amazon-tax-law.
45. See S. 3353, 96th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (I11.2010).
46. See H. File 2510, 83d Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Iowa 2010).
47. See S. 1071, 2009 Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Md. 2009). The bill failed to make it
out of committee. See Missy Ward, Maryland Advertising Tax SB 1071 Gets Squashed,
MISSYWARD.COM, Apr. 14, 2009, http://missyward.com/2009/04/14/maryland-advertisingtax-sb-1071-gets-squashed/.
48. See S. 282,2009-10 Leg., 86th Sess. (Minn. 2009).
49. See S. 2927, 2010 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Miss. 2010). The bill died in Committee on
February 2, 2010. See Mississippi Legislature 2010 Regular Session, Senate Bill 2927,
http://billstatus.ls.state.ms.us/2010/pdf/history/SB/SB2927.xml (last visited Apr. 14, 2010).
50. See H. 50, 49th Leg., 2d Sess. (N.M. 2010).
51. North Carolina's Amazon tax was included in the state's budget for Fiscal Year
2009-11. See 2009-4 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. 503 (LexisNexis).
52. Rhode Island's Amazon tax was included in the most recent state budget. See R.I.
Gen. Laws § 44-18-15 (Supp. 2009); Neil Downing, R.L's Amazon Law Gets Support,
PROVIDENCE JOURNAL, July 25, 2009, http://www.povertyinstitute.org/matriarch/
documentsi7.25.09%20Providence%20Journal%20Rl%20Amazon%2OLaw%2OGets%20
Support.pdf.
53. See H. 1947 / S. 1741, 106 Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2009).
54. See H. 661, 2010 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Vt. 2010).
55. See S. 660, 2010 Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2010).
56. While members of the Wisconsin General Assembly have considered the Amazon
tax, they have yet to introduce any specific legislation to change the state's tax code. See
Joseph Henchman, "Amazon Tax" Laws Signal Business Unfriendlinessand Will Worsen
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States' efforts, the constitutionality of the Amazon tax remains
contentious.
II. BACKGROUND LAW: QUILL CORP. V. NORTH DAKOTA
The constitutionality of taxing out-of-state Internet retailers
hinges on the interpretation and application of the Supreme Court's
decision in Quill. 7 "Quill was a Delaware corporation with offices
and warehouses in Illinois, California, and Georgia."58 The company
solicited business in North Dakota and other states "through catalogs
and flyers, advertisements in national periodicals, and telephone
calls."59 Of its nearly $200 million in sales, "almost $1 million [were]
made to about 3,000 customers in North Dakota."' Before 1987,
Quill was not considered a "retailer" under North Dakota's use
statute-North Dakota required " 'every retailer maintaining a place
of business in' the State to collect the tax from the consumer and
remit it to the State."6 In 1987, however, the definition of "retailers"
was expanded to include " 'every person who engages in regular or
systematic solicitation of a consumer market in th[e] state.' "62 This
change forced Quill to collect a use tax on all orders it received from
North Dakota residents.63
Quill challenged North Dakota's use tax on both Due Process

Clause and Commerce Clause grounds, 64 relying heavily on the
Supreme Court's decision in Bellas Hess.65 Before analyzing the
validity of these claims, the Quill Court made clear that the "nexus"

Short-Term Budget Problems, TAX FOUND., Mar. 8, 2010, http://www.taxfoundation.org/
publications/show/25949.html.
57. See Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 314-15 (1992); see also Buechler,
supra note 34, at 485, 488-91 (arguing that substantial nexus law related to mail-order
companies will likely apply to cyberspace commerce as well); McGinnis, supra note 34, at
161-67 (arguing that Quill remains the modern test for substantial nexus analysis).
58. Quill,504 U.S. at 302.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. (quoting N.D. CENT. CODE § 57-40.2-07 (Supp. 1991)).
62. Id. at 302-03 (quoting N.D. CENT. CODE § 57-40.2-01(6) (Supp. 1991)). "Regular
or systematic solicitation" meant "three or more advertisements within a 12-month
period." Id. at 303 (quoting N.D. ADMIN. CODE 81-04.1-01-03.1 (1988)).
63. Id. at 303. The statute was specifically "crafted to allow for the taxation of mailorder companies that maintained no property or personnel in the state." McGinnis, supra
note 34, at 161-62.
64. Quill, 504 U.S. at 303-04.
65. "In this case ...we must either reverse the State Supreme Court or overrule
Bellas Hess. While we agree with much of the state court's reasoning, we take the former
course." Id. at 301-02; see also McGinnis, supra note 34, at 165 (arguing that reliance on
Bellas Hess was proper and such reliance furthered the goals of the Commerce Clause).
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analyses under the Due Process Clause and Commerce Clause are
distinct.' The two clauses concern different values and governmental
interests:
Due process centrally concerns the fundamental fairness of
governmental activity. Thus, at the most general level, the due
process nexus analysis requires that we ask whether an
individual's connections with a State are substantial enough to
legitimate the State's exercise of power over him. We have,
therefore, often identified "notice" or "fair warning" as the
analytic touchstone of due process nexus analysis. In contrast,
the Commerce Clause and its nexus requirement are informed
not so much by concerns about fairness for the individual
defendant as by structural concerns about the effects of state
regulation on the national economy.67

First, the Court considered the Due Process Clause nexus
requirement. In order for a state to tax out-of-state companies, the
"Due Process Clause requires some definite link, some minimum
connection, between a state and the person, property or transaction it
seeks to tax ...and that the income attributed to the State for tax

purposes must be rationally related to values connected with the
taxing State."68 Building on its landmark decision in International
Shoe Co. v. Washington,6 9 the Court's analysis shifted from an
examination of physical presence of the company within the state to
"a more flexible inquiry,"7 which examines whether an out-of-state
company has "purposefully avail[ed] itself of the benefits of an
economic market in the forum State."71 As a result of the evolving
Due Process Clause jurisprudence, the Quill Court overruled the
portion of the Bellas Hess decision that held such physical presence
was required to establish minimum contacts under the Due Process

66. Quill, 504 U.S. at 305-07 ("Thus, although we have not always been precise in
distinguishing between the two, the Due Process Clause and the Commerce Clause are
analytically distinct.").
67. Id. at 312.
68. Id. at 306 (citations and quotations omitted).
69. 326 U.S. 310 (1945). In InternationalShoe, the Court explained that due process
requires that a defendant have minimum contacts with the forum "'such that the
maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice.' "Id. at 316 (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)).
70. Quill, 504 U.S. at 307.
71. Id.; see also Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 476 (1985) ("So long as
a commercial actor's efforts are 'purposefully directed' toward residents of another State,
we have consistently rejected the notion that an absence of physical contacts can defeat
personal jurisdiction there.").
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Clause.72 Furthermore, the Court found that Quill purposefully
availed itself of North Dakota's market and thus satisfied the

minimum contacts requirement under the Due Process Clause.7 3
Second, the Court addressed the separate "nexus" inquiry under
the dormant Commerce Clause. Applying the four-part test from
Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady,74 the Quill Court held that

courts should
sustain a tax against a Commerce Clause challenge so long as
the "tax [1] is applied to an activity with a substantial nexus
with the taxing State, [2] is fairly apportioned, [3] does not
discriminate against interstate commerce, and [4] is fairly
related to the services provided by the State."7 5
The

Court's decision

in Complete Auto "emphasized

the

importance of looking past 'the formal language of the tax statute [to]
its practical effect,' "76 and overruled prior cases that attempted to
distinguish between "direct"

and "indirect"

taxes.77 Bellas Hess

concerned the first prong of the Complete Auto test and "stands for
the proposition that a vendor whose only contacts with the taxing
State are by mail or common carrier lacks the 'substantial nexus'
required by the Commerce Clause."7 8 In other words, the dormant
Commerce Clause substantial nexus test requires some physical

presence in the taxing state before the state can require an out-ofstate retailer to collect taxes.7 9
72. Quill, 504 U.S. at 319 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment) ("I agree with the Court that the Due Process Clause holding of Bellas Hess
should be overruled."); see also id. at 307 (majority opinion) ("[T]he Court suggested that
such [physical] presence was not only sufficient for jurisdiction under the Due Process
Clause, but also necessary.").
73. Id. at 308 (majority opinion).
74. 430 U.S. 274 (1977).
75. Quill, 504 U.S. at 311 (alteration in original) (quoting Complete Auto, 430 U.S. at
279).
76. Id. at 310 (quoting Complete Auto, 430 U.S. at 279).
77. Id. at 309-11 (specifying that Complete Auto overruled Freeman v. Hewitt, 329
U.S. 249 (1946), and its progeny).
78. Id. at 311. Furthermore, "the substantial nexus requirement is not, like due
process' minimum contacts requirement, a proxy for notice, but rather a means for
limiting state burdens on interstate commerce." Id. at 313 (quotations omitted). Indeed,
"the 'substantial nexus' requirement has evolved into more than a mere proxy for notice,
like the due process 'minimum contacts' requirement, and now acts as a sword against
states seeking to gratuitously impose their taxes on interstate commerce." McGinnis,
supra note 34, at 165.
79. Quill, 504 U.S. at 315 ("Whether or not a State may compel a vendor to collect a
sales or use tax may turn on the presence in the taxing State of a small sales force, plant, or
office.").
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Despite the push for pragmatism over formalism in Commerce

Clause jurisprudence,'

the Quill Court maintained the bright-line

rule articulated in Bellas Hess.8 Accordingly, the Court found that
the North Dakota tax imposed on Quill was unconstitutional",
because Quill did "no more than communicate with customers in the

State by mail or common carrier as part of a general interstate
business. "83
As a result of the Supreme Court's decisions in Bellas Hess and

Quill, courts must analyze taxes on out-of-state corporations under
both the Due Process Clause and the Commerce Clause. While most
out-of-state corporations will satisfy the weakened Due Process
Clause requirement of purposeful availment, it remains difficult for

states to establish the sufficient nexus between itself and the out-ofstate corporation necessary to satisfy the Commerce Clause
requirement. These difficulties led to the passage of New York's

Amazon tax, which attempts to ease the process and statutorily create
the requisite substantial nexus.
III.

AMAZON. COM V. NEW YORK STATE DEPARTMENT OF TAXATION
& FINANCE

Since it is difficult for states to establish a substantial nexus with
out-of-state corporations, New York attempted to create statutorily
the necessary nexus with the passage of its Amazon tax.8' As this
Recent Development argues, however, New York's attempt fails to

satisfy the requirements of Quill.

80. Id. at 314-15. Many legal scholars have denounced the formalistic approach of
Quill because "the nexus tests in Quill are vulnerable to manipulation by a seller engaging
in an electronic commerce transaction." Trahan, supra note 37, at 112. For example, the
physical presence test can be avoided with entity isolation or by manipulating relationships
with telecommunications providers. Id. at 113-17; see also John A. Swain, Cybertaxation
and the Commerce Clause: Entity Isolation or Affiliate Nexus?, 75 S.CAL. L. REv. 419, 473
(2002) ("[S]ales tax equity can be fully achieved only if Quill's anachronistic physical
presence test is either judicially or legislatively overruled.").
81. Quill, 504 U.S. at 311-12, 314. Justice White, however, dissented from this portion
of the Court's opinion. Id. at 333 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
82. Id. at 301-02 (majority opinion). The Court went to great lengths to explain why
Bellas Hess and its bright-line rule remain good law. While the Court agreed with much of
the North Dakota Supreme Court's decision, it ultimately determined that a bright-line
rule in this area is beneficial. Id. at 312-18. Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas, on the
other hand, would declare the North Dakota tax unconstitutional on stare decisis grounds
and not "revisit the merits of [the Bellas Hess] holding." Id. at 320 (Scalia, J., concurring in
part and concurring in the judgment).
83. Id. at 311 (majority opinion).
84. N.Y. TAX LAW § 1101(b)(8)(vi) (McKinney Supp. 2010).
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The Amazon Tax and Amazon's Associates

Less than a month after New York's Amazon tax was passed,
Amazon filed suit challenging its constitutionality. 85 Amazon argued,

inter alia, that the tax-on its face and as applied-violated the
dormant Commerce Clause.8 6 The New York trial court, relying
heavily on Scripto, Inc. v. Carson8 7 and Orvis Co. v. Tax Appeals
Tribunal of New York' and marginalizing Quill, ruled in favor of
New York and upheld the Amazon tax.89

Before analyzing the trial court's decision, it is important to
understand fully the agreement between Amazon and its associates9 °
and the role these associates play for Amazon. While Quill dealt with

traditional mail-order companies, Amazon is the quintessential
twenty-first century mail-order company. 91 Amazon's Web site

reaches millions of Internet users every day both in New York and
around the world. These consumers purchase items from Amazon's
Internet "catalog," and Amazon in turn ships these items by mail or
common carrier to the consumers. Amazon has no employees or
property located in New York. 92

Amazon Associates are part of a new wave of online advertising
called the performance marketing approach ("PMA"). 93 The PMA is

based on the business model first employed by catalog retailers who
used print advertising to communicate with potential customers and
then took and shipped orders from a central location. 94 The Internetbased PMA is based on two steps: (1) "the retailer [i.e., Amazon]
85. Saul Hansell, Amazon Sues New York over Tax, SEATTLE TIMES, May 3, 2008,
http://seattletimes.nwsource.comlhtml/businesstechnology/2004389623-amazon3.html.
86. Amazon.com v. N.Y. State Dep't of Taxation & Fin., 877 N.Y.S.2d 842, 846 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 2009).
87. 362 U.S. 207 (1960).
88. 654 N.E.2d 954 (N.Y. 1995).
89. Amazon.com, 877 N.Y.S.2d at 846-47.
90. As explained more fully infra, the fact that Amazon called its associates
"independent contractors" in its Operating Agreement was an important factor in the
court's decision. See infra Parts III.B-C.
91. See CHRIS ANDERSON, THE LONG TAIL: WHY THE FUTURE OF BUSINESS IS
SELLING LESS OF MORE 47-49 (1st paperback ed. 2008) (describing the ascension of
online retailers, such as Amazon.com, who effectively utilize the barrier-free
infrastructure of online retail).
92. Amazon's Memorandum of Law in Support of its Cross-Motion for Summary
Judgment and in Opposition to the State's Motion to Dismiss at 19, Amazon.com v. N.Y.
State Dep't of Taxation & Fin., 877 N.Y.S.2d 842 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2009) (No. 601247/08).
93. See Brief of Amicus Curiae Performance Marketing Alliance in Support of
Plaintiffs-Appellants at 3-4, No. 601247/08 (N.Y. App. Div. filed Sept. 2, 2009). For a
more detailed discussion of performance-based marketing, see id. at 3-10.
94. Id. at 4.
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signs a standardized agreement with various entities that run
websites, known in the industry as 'affiliates,' to publish and display
an electronic advertisement for the retailer on their websites,"95 and
then (2) "the visitor to the affiliate's website ...may, without any

involvement by or notice to the affiliate, view the advertiser's
electronic

ad and decide to click through to the advertiser's

website."9 6 Other than placing the advertisement on its Web site, the
affiliate has no "direct involvement" in the transaction between the
customer and the Internet retailer.97 Thus, unlike independent
contractors, the role played by affiliates is minimal.98
More specifically, Amazon's Associate Program "allows
participants ... to maintain links to Amazon.com on their own
websites and compensates them by paying a percentage of the
proceeds of the sale."99 Before approving an associate application,
Amazon reviews the applicant's Web site to ensure that it does not

promote sexually explicit materials, violence, illegal activities, or the
like.1" Web site owners who are accepted are granted "a revocable,
non-exclusive, worldwide, royalty-free license ... solely for purposes

of facilitating referrals from [their site] to the Amazon Site""1 1 and
enter into an "independent contractor" relationship with Amazon." 2
Associates receive a referral fee of varying percentages based on the

95. Id.
96. Id. at 5.
97. Id. at 6. For example, the affiliate "functions exclusively as a publisher of an
electronic advertisement" and does not (1) "directly sell any product to any Web User and
does not have a sales force that affirmatively solicits potential customers for the retailer,"
(2) "receive payment from the Web Users who purchase an advertiser's products or
services," (3) "deliver a product or service to any person," (4) "know the identity of the
visitors to its website, if any, who click through from its website to that of the retailer and
whether those visitors ultimately purchase a product from the advertiser," and (5) have
"involvement in the final sales transaction between the Web User and the retailer through
the retailer's website." Id.
98. Id.
99. Amazon.com v. N.Y. State Dep't of Taxation & Fin., 877 N.Y.S.2d 842, 845 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 2009) (quotations omitted); see AMAZON.COM, ASSOCIATES PROGRAM
OPERATING AGREEMENT 1 1 (Jan. 18, 2010) [hereinafter OPERATING AGREEMENT],
https://affiliate-program.amazon.com/ (select "Operating Agreement" under "Customer
Support").
100. OPERATING AGREEMENT, supra note 99, 1. A typical Amazon Associate Web
site might be a Web site that reviews GPS devices. Interested buyers would then be
directed to GPS devices for sale on Amazon by clicking on a link on the GPS-reviewing
Web site. Amazon "authorizes Associates to place different types of links from their
websites to its own." Amazon.com, 877 N.Y.S.2d at 845.
101. Amazon.com, 877 N.Y.S.2d at 845; OPERATING AGREEMENT, supra note 99, 1 2.
102. Amazon.corn, 877 N.Y.S.2d at 845; OPERATING AGREEMENT, supra note 99,
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type of product sold on Amazon.com or its affiliate Web sites." 3 New

York argued that Amazon's Operating Agreement ("Operating
Agreement") created a substantial nexus between Amazon and New
York."' The New York trial court conducted its dormant Commerce
Clause analysis and agreed that the Operating Agreement created the
requisite nexus between Amazon and New York."°5
B.

The Complete Auto Test and the SubstantialNexus Prong

The New York trial court began its dormant Commerce Clause
analysis by laying out the four-part Complete Auto test0 6 and
recognized that the decision in Amazon.com hinged on the
interpretation of the first prong-whether a substantial nexus exists
between New York and Amazon.0 7 The trial court's legal analysis
under the substantial nexus prong, however, is flawed in several
respects.
Under Quill, the Supreme Court held that a substantial nexus
does not exist between a retailer and a state when the retailer's only
connection with the state is by mail or common carrier. °8 The Quill
Court was clear: physical presence, in the form of "a small sales force,
plant or office""'° is required.' 0 By requiring this substantial nexus,
the Quill Court was "limiting state burdens on interstate
commerce"111 and helping to foster economic growth in interstate
112
commerce.

Instead of relying on Quill, however, the New York trial court
followed two prior New York state court decisions, Scripto and
Orvis,"3 and maintained that even the slightest physical presence is
103. Amazon.com, 877 N.Y.S.2d at 845; OPERATING AGREEMENT, supra note 99,

4-5.
104. See Reply Memorandum of Law in Further Support of Defendants' Motions to
Dismiss and in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment at 10-13,
Amazon.com, 877 N.Y.S.2d 842 (No. 601247/08).
105. See Amazon.corn, 877 N.Y.S.2d at 849.
106. Id. at 847 (quoting Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 279
(1977)).
-107. Id.
108. Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 311 (1992).
109. Id. at 315.
110. See McGinnis, supra note 34, at 199. For a summary of the current state of the law
related to substantial nexus and physical presence, see In re Appeal of Intercard, Inc., 14
P.3d 1111, 1122 (Kan. 2000).
111. Quill,504 U.S. at 313.
112. Id. at 316.
113. As one author has argued, "Courts, like the Orvis Court, have ignored the root
physical presence requirement that is the foundation of the establishment of nexus for
taxation purposes." McGinnis, supra note 34, at 199-200. Instead, state courts, like the
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enough to create a substantial nexus.1 14 According to the trial court,

this physical presence requirement "can be actual or imputed based
on the in-state solicitation of sales by an employee, agent, or
independent contractor of the retailer on its behalf."" 5 The trial court
failed to address Amazon's argument that while its associates were
labeled "independent contractors" in the Operating Agreement their
role is more akin to that of an advertiser, and instead concluded that

the substantial nexus prong had been satisfied primarily because
Amazon did not discourage its New York associates from soliciting

within the state. " 6 As this Recent Development argues, the trial court
failed to analyze properly the role an Amazon Associate plays for

Amazon-that of an advertiser and not of an independent contractor.
The failure of the New York trial court to examine properly the
activities of Amazon's associates enabled the court to uphold the tax.
Examining the actual functions performed by the associates should

have led the trial court to determine that Amazon's associates are
merely advertisers and not "independent contractors"-despite the
boilerplate language in the Amazon Operating Agreement. 117 This
Orvis court, have relied on a company's economic presence in the taxing state. Id. at 200.
This can likely be explained by the desire to uphold the large revenue sources these taxes
produce. See id. ("Although Orvis was but one example of the blatant disregard of
Supreme Court jurisprudence, state courts have found it to be a fruitful revenue source
and frequently rely upon its faulty reasoning."); see also Borders Online, LLC v. Cal. Bd.
of Equalization, 29 Cal. Rptr. 3d 176, 190 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005) (following the approach
taken by the New York court in Orvis).
114. Amazon.com v. N.Y. State Dep't of Taxation & Fin., 877 N.Y.S.2d 842, 847 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 2009). Although state courts have reinterpreted this physical presence
requirement to include a "slightest physical presence," manifested by economic activities
within the taxing state, this interpretation misstates the core requirement of Quill. See
McGinnis, supra note 34, at 201 ("[lIt is also established that a slightest presence will also
not create nexus. States, not surprisingly, have sought to impose the tax when a business
has little more than a slightest presence. Rather, to comply with Quill, the physical
presence requirement should hinge on the presence [with]in the taxing state of a small
sales force, plant, or office." (quotations omitted)); see also In re Appeal of Intercard, 14
P.3d at 1119 ("The Orvis court ignores the Quill holding that sufficient physical presence
is a necessary element of the nexus required for a state to impose a use tax collection duty.
Economic presence cannot negate this requirement.").
115. Amazon.com, 877 N.Y.S.2d at 847.
116. Id. at 848-49.
117. While it is unclear why the New York trial court did not examine more closely the
actual functions performed by Amazon's associates, it is important to note that many state
courts have attempted to ignore Quill and its substantial nexus requirement, in order to
uphold the ability of states to tax out-of-state retailers. See McGinnis, supra note 34, at
199-200. Compare Magnetek, Inc. v. Treasury Dep't, 562 N.W.2d 219, 223 (Mich. Ct. App.
1997) (following the broad interpretation of "physical presence" from Orvis), with Fla.
Dep't of Revenue v. Share Int'l, Inc., 676 So. 2d 1362, 1363 (Fla. 1996) (following the more
demanding interpretation of "physical presence" from Quill).
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would have allowed the trial court to rely on Quill, rather than
Scripto and Orvis, and hold that a substantial nexus does not exist
between Amazon and New York." 8 Furthermore, had the New York
trial court examined more fully the role of Amazon's associates, it
would have found that Amazon does not substantially rely on the
advertising its associates provide to establish and maintain a market
in New York.'19 The "crucial factor governing nexus is whether the
activities performed [in the taxing state] on behalf of the taxpayer are
significantly associated with the taxpayer's ability to establish and
maintain a market in [the] state for the sales."' 2 ° This is not the case
for Amazon and its associates. Amazon's advertising activity in New
York through the use of marketing affiliates is not equivalent to the
Internet retailer maintaining a sales force, office, or plant in the state.
As a result, Amazon's connection with New York does not satisfy the
substantial nexus prong.
C. Application of Quill Is Properin Amazon.com

The New York trial court held that Amazon's associates were
independent contractors soliciting orders on behalf of Amazon,12' but
this holding misconstrues the role the associates played. As
articulated in more detail above,122 the associates are "independent
third parties ... only in the business of generating their own content

and displaying it on their own websites, while also publishing
1' 23
electronic advertisements for Amazon and other Internet retailers.'
After an Internet viewer clicks on an Amazon link, "the [associate]
has no further connection with or knowledge of the communications
between the potential customer and Amazon concerning a
transaction or its fulfillment ....The [associate] also has no ability to

insert itself in the sales transaction and influence the customer to
make a purchase.', 124 Amazon and the consumer enter into a
transaction; Amazon receives payment from the consumer; Amazon
118. See Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 313 & n.6 (1992).
119. See Tyler Pipe Indus., Inc. v. Wash. State Dep't of Revenue, 483 U.S. 232, 250-51
(1987).
120. Id. at 250. "[Dle minimis local activities or proof that the local activities do not
generate any significant proportion of local sales" will not satisfy the substantial nexus
requirement. Borders Online, LLC v. State Bd. of Equalization, 29 Cal. Rptr. 3d 176, 191
(Cal. Ct. App. 2005). This is a question of fact determined by the court. Id.
121. Amazon.com, 877 N.Y.S.2d at 845.
122. See supra Part III.A.
123. Brief of Amicus Curiae Performance Marketing Alliance in Support of PlaintiffsAppellants, supra note 93, at 16.
124. Id. As the Performance Marketing Alliance Amicus Brief illustrates, it is more
beneficial to examine what the affiliates cannot do. Id. at 16-17.
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ships the product to the consumer-it is only after the transaction is
completed that the associate receives payment for the "click
through."' 2 5 This is not the role of an independent contractor but
rather an advertiser.
Furthermore, by upholding the constitutionality of the Amazon
tax, the New York trial court implied that there is a distinction
between an in-state versus an out-of-state Web site owner. 126 As a
result, New York is able to impose a sales and use tax on the
happenstance that some of Amazon's marketing associates live in
New York. 127 The residency of the associates, however, should have
no bearing on the substantial nexus between New York and Amazon.
There should be no constitutional distinction based on the fact that
one Web site owner lives in New York, while another lives just across
the border in Pennsylvania. 128 The location of a server or Web site
owner is irrelevant to the average Internet user. 129 The focus must be
125. Id. at 12.
126. Imagine, for example, a Web site that discusses the many places to hike in the
Adirondack Mountains. This particular Web site owner is an Amazon Associate and has
Amazon.com links on his site that visitors can click on if they are interested in buying
hiking boots or camping equipment. The Web site will undoubtedly attract visitors who
live in New York. Under the New York trial court's reasoning, if the Web site owner
happens to live in New York, then a substantial nexus has been created between New
York and Amazon. See Amazon.com, 877 N.Y.S.2d at 847. But it is just as likely that this
Web site owner will live in Pennsylvania, New Jersey, or Delaware. If that is the case, no
substantial nexus will be created between New York and Amazon, even though the Web
site is still attracting New York residents and resulting in sales on Amazon.com from New
York residents. Such logic simply does not make sense.
127. See Walter J. Baudier, iBrief, Internet Sales Taxes from Borders to Amazon: How
Long Before All of Your Purchases Are Taxed?, 2006 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 0005, 2,
(2006), http://www.law.duke.edu/journals/dltr/articles/pdf/2006dltrOOO5.pdf (noting that
states and sometimes local jurisdictions have the power to impose sales and use taxes and
to define what is subject to their tax).
128. See generally McGinnis, supra note 34 (arguing that substantial nexus requires a
small workforce, plant, or office). Advertisers who happen to live in the taxing state will
not satisfy this physical presence requirement. Id. at 197-203.
129. In fact, many Web sites are stored on multiple servers in multiple locations; thus,
the average Internet user likely does not know where the Web site he is viewing is actually
located. See 1-800 Contacts, Inc. v. WhenU.com, 309 F. Supp. 2d 467, 475 n.14 (S.D.N.Y.
2003) ("Given that a single website contains text and information located on multiple
servers, when a user's computer accesses a single website, the computer may be receiving
information from several different servers."); see also Brief of Amicus Curiae
Performance Marketing Alliance in Support of Plaintiffs-Appellants, supra note 93, at 26
("The state of incorporation or physical location of a website's server is irrelevant to the
Web User's decision whether to visit a website."). If this were the case, Amazon simply
could screen Web site applications and reject those Web site owners who lived in New
York. This would not hurt Amazon's ability to advertise in New York or receive "click
throughs" from New York residents-it would only hurt the potential associates denied
from the program. Brief of Amicus Curiae Performance Marketing Alliance in Support of
Plaintiffs-Appellants, supra note 93, at 26.
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on Amazon and its physical presence within New York-does
Amazon have "a small sales force, plant, or office" located in the
state? 130 The associates and their advertising activities in New York

are not enough to create a physical presence for Amazon in New
York.' Thus, Amazon has not satisfied the substantial nexus prong.
The role Amazon's associates play is more similar to the role

"the publishers of the 'national periodicals' that contained print
advertisements played in the catalog marketing program that was
held in Quill not to create a 'substantial nexus' with the taxing
' The associates passively display advertisements for Amazon
state."132

on their Web sites and nothing more. The PMA is an innovative new
advertising tool, which allows companies to reach potential customers
more effectively and help small Internet companies develop their own
Web sites more quickly' 3 3 -but it is simply advertising. The Amazon

tax "improperly singles out and discriminates against advertisers that
use the performance marketing channel, as opposed to other, more
traditional forms of advertising."' 34 Thus, the New York trial court
exaggerated and misinterpreted the role played by Amazon's

associates and their advertising function.
Even assuming that a court could find that Amazon's associates
created a "physical presence" for Amazon in New York, the trial
court failed to examine the importance of these associates to
Amazon's overall ability to operate in New York.'35 The court
concluded that the associates are independent contractors 36 without

130. Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298,315 (1992).
131. See Brief of Amicus Curiae Performance Marketing Alliance in Support of
Plaintiffs-Appellants, supra note 93, at 16-18 (analyzing the activities of Amazon's
affiliates and stating that they do not, "under Quill, create a 'physical presence' in New
York"); McGinnis, supra note 34, at 199-200.
132. Brief of Amicus Curiae Performance Marketing Alliance in Support of PlaintiffsAppellants, supra note 93, at 18 (citing Quill, 504 U.S. at 302).
133. Id. at 2; see also Am. Library Ass'n v. United States, 201 F. Supp. 2d 401, 416
(E.D. Pa. 2002) ("Unlike television, cable, radio, newspapers, magazines or books, the
Internet provides an opportunity for those with access to it to communicate with a
worldwide audience at little cost.").
134. Brief of Amicus Curiae Performance Marketing Alliance in Support of PlaintiffsAppellants, supra note 93, at 2. "Affiliates are content providers whose principal mission
is to attract users to their own websites to review the information and content that they
create and display. They do not drum up business for Amazon or other companies." Id. at
17.
135. See Tyler Pipe Indus., Inc. v. Wash. State Dep't of Revenue, 483 U.S. 232, 250
(1987).
136. Amazon.com v. N.Y. State Dep't of Taxation & Fin., 877 N.Y.S.2d 842, 845 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 2009). The court reached this conclusion based on the fact that Amazon's
Operating Agreement with associates defines the relationship between Amazon and the
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also examining whether "'the activities performed in [New York] on
behalf of [Amazon] are significantly associated with [Amazon]'s
ability to establish and maintain a market in [New York] for the
sales.' "137 Because of the court's reliance on the phrase "independent

contractor" from Amazon's Operating Agreement, the court was able
to marginalize the decision in Quill and place its reliance, instead, on

Scripto38 and Orvis. Such reliance, however, is improper because in
both cases the independent contractors were essential to the
companies' ability to maintain a market in the taxing state. This is not
the case for Amazon and its associates.
In Scripto, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of a
Florida sales and use tax on Scripto, a Georgia corporation.139 Scripto

established an "advertising specialty division trading under the name

of Adgif Company,"' 40 which employed ten salesmen in Florida that
marketed and sold Scripto's products in the state. 141 In each written

contract with the salesmen, Scripto made clear that the relationship
' 142
between the parties was that of "independent contractors;"
however, each salesman "actively engaged in Florida as a
representative 'of Scripto for the purpose of attracting, soliciting and

obtaining Florida customers.' "143
Reliance on Scripto is inapt for several reasons. As a threshold
matter, Scripto arguably was not decided under the dormant
associates as one of "independent contractors." OPERATING AGREEMENT, supra note 99,

14.
137. Tyler Pipe, 483 U.S. at 250 (quoting Tyler Pipe Indus., Inc. v. Wash. State Dep't of
Revenue, 715 P.2d 123, 126 (Wash. 1986), vacated, 483 U.S. 232 (1987)); see also Scripto,
Inc. v. Carson, 362 U.S. 207, 211 (1960) ("The formal shift in the contractual tagging of the
salesman as 'independent' neither results in changing his local function of solicitation nor
bears upon its effectiveness in securing a substantial flow of goods into Florida."); Brief of
the Tax Foundation as Amicus Curiae in Support of Plaintiffs-Appellants, supra note 18,
at 9 ("The trial court ... did not conduct any evaluation in regard to whether [Amazon's]
'local function' [was] significantly associated with maintenance or establishment of [their]
sales market in New York." (citing Amazon.corn, 877 N.Y.S.2d at 849)); Sam Zaprzalka,
Note, New York's Amazon Tax Not Out of the Forest Yet: The Battle over Affiliate Nexus,
33 SEATrLE U. L. REV. 527, 539 (2010) ("The Court held that whether or not a
salesperson was classified as an independent contractor was not determinative for nexus
purposes.").
138. Scripto is an example of attributional nexus, which "takes the physical presence of
an in-state entity and attributes that presence to the out-of-state retailer in order to subject
the remote retailer to taxation." Andrew W. Swain & Nathaniel T. Trelease, Taxing Time
for the Internet?, Bus. L. TODAY, Nov.-Dec. 2005, at 11, 13.
139. Scripto, 362 U.S. at 213.
140. Id. at 208.
141. Id. at 209.
142. Id.
143. Id. (emphasis added) (citation omitted in original).
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Commerce Clause. While the Scripto Court relied on cases dealing
with the Commerce Clause, 4 the Quill Court-in clarifying the
"nexus"
distinction between the Due Process and Commerce 1Clause
45
case.
Clause
Process
Due
a
as
Scripto
tests-classified
Even if Scripto could be classified as a dormant Commerce
Clause case, a substantial nexus linked Florida and Scripto because
Scripto relied on its salesmen to maintain a market in Florida.'46 This
was not the case in Amazon.com. The salesmen in Scripto were
actively involved in soliciting sales for the company-they received
"catalogs, samples, and advertising material" and the "[o]rders for
such products [were] sent by these salesmen directly to the Atlanta
office for acceptance or refusal., 147 Amazon's associates, on the other
hand, are not involved in the actual sale between Amazon and its
customers. Rather, the associates are similar to advertisers who
essentially act as electronic billboards, passively displaying links on
their Web sites that point customers to items they may wish to
purchase from Amazon. Thus, the facts in Amazon.com are
substantially different from those in Scripto. It appears that the New
York trial court placed constitutional significance on the magic words
"independent contractors" and determined that these words created a
substantial nexus between New York and Amazon. The trial court
should not have relied on the way these associates were
characterized, but rather on the practical significance of their
activities vis-A-vis Amazon.
The New York trial court's dependence on Orvis is misguided for
these same reasons. In Orvis, the court found that both Orvis and
Vermont Information Processing ("VIP") had a substantial nexus
with New York because both companies' activities in New York

144. See id. at 212 (stating that General Trading Co. v. State Tax Commission, 322 U.S.
335 (1944), served as the basis for the holding).
145. Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 306-07 (1992) ("These cases all
involved some sort of physical presence within the State, and in Bellas Hess the Court
suggested that such presence was not only sufficient for jurisdiction under the Due Process
Clause, but also necessary."). While the Court went on briefly to discuss Scripto under its
dormant Commerce Clause analysis, the Court viewed Scripto as an extension of its Due
Process Clause jurisprudence. Id. It is, therefore, improper to rely on Scripto after Quill as
anything other than a Due Process Clause case.
146. See Scripto, 362 U.S. at 210-12; Tyler Pipe Indus., Inc. v. Wash. State Dep't of
Revenue, 483 U.S. 232, 250 (1987) (emphasizing the importance of the relationship
between the behavior in question and the maintenance of a sales market in the state).
147. Scripto, 362 U.S. at 207.
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"were an essential part of [their] ability to do business in the state."14' 8
Orvis's salesmen made systematic visits "to all of its as many as 19
wholesale customers on the average of four times a year," while VIP's
"visits to New York vendees and its assurances to prospective
customers that it would make such visits enhanced sales and
significantly contributed to VIP's ability to establish and maintain a
market1 49for the computer hardware and software it sold in New
York.'
Without Orvi's and VIP's salesmen visiting customers in
New York, neither company would have been able to maintain a
market in the state. That was not the case in Amazon.com because
"click-through" advertising was not necessary for Amazon to
maintain a market in New York. 5 ° Thus, the facts in Amazon.com are
substantially different from those in Orvis.
If the New York trial court had properly relied on Quill's
substantial nexus bright-line rule, the court would have held the New
York tax unconstitutional. Invalidating the New York tax would have
confirmed that the "settled expectations" applicable to mail-order
companies also applied to Internet retailers. 5 ' Instead, the trial court
has opened the door to thousands of new taxes levied on these
Internet retailers. As one court has aptly noted, "[w]ithout the
limitation's [sic] imposed by the Commerce Clause, ... inconsistent
regulatory schemes could paralyze the development of the Internet
altogether."'52 If other courts adopt the Amazon.com reasoning, the
"freedom" of the Internet will be further reduced.
After receiving the decision from the New York trial court,
Amazon appealed the ruling on July 13, 2009,153 to the New York
Supreme Court Appellate Division, First Judicial Department. A
five-judge panel of the Appellate Division, First Judicial Department
heard oral arguments for the appeal on October 29, 2009.114 Several
148. Amazon's Reply Memorandum of Law in Further Support of its Cross-Motion for
Summary Judgment at 13, Amazon.com v. N.Y. State Dep't of Taxation & Fin., 877
N.Y.S.2d 842 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2009) (No. 601247/08).
149. Orvis Co. v. Tax Appeals Tribunal of New York, 654 N.E.2d 954, 962 (N.Y. 1995).
150. See Henchman, supra note 56 (noting that the referrals from Amazon's New York
affiliates contribute to "only 1.5 percent of Amazon.com's sales in New York").
151. Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 316 (1992).
152. Am. Libraries Ass'n v. Pataki, 969 F. Supp. 160,181 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
153. Tag Team: PMA Backs Amazon in New York Tax Legal Fight,REVE NEWS, Sept.

9, 2009, http://www.revenews.com/admin/tag-team-pma-backs-amazon-in-new-york-taxlegal-fight/.
154. Jeffrey S. Reed, Court Hears Oral Argument in Amazon, Overstock Appeals, 54
ST. TAX NOTES 369, 369 (2009), available at http://www.mwe.com/info/pubs/
TaxAnalysts1109.pdf. The appeal was a consolidation of the Amazon.com and the
Overstock.com cases. See id.

1444

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 88

trade groups filed amicus briefs supporting Amazon's position. 155 A
decision is expected sometime in 2010.
IV. THE FUTURE OF QUILL AND THE SUBSTANTIAL NEXUS
REQUIREMENT

The Amazon.com decision raises new questions as to the
continuing vitality of Quill and its bright-line substantial nexus rule.

The Quill Court argued that "a bright-line rule in the area of sales
and use taxes also encourages settled expectations and, in doing so,
fosters investment by businesses and individuals.'

56

For over fifteen

years, Internet retailers have relied on Quill and its bright-line rule.'57
The decision in Amazon.com, however 158 blurs the rule and further
jeopardizes the expectations of Internet retailers. Other states-and
perhaps even local jurisdictions, such as counties and towns-will
begin experimenting with and implementing new sales and use taxes,
and Internet retailers will be forced to divert time and resources away
from business operations to lobby against these taxes and argue their

constitutionality in court. 159 Furthermore, judicial resources (limited
as they are) will be expended adjudicating these cases, since simple
reliance on Quill is no longer possible."6 As a result, this Recent
155. See, e.g., Brief of the Tax Foundation as Amicus Curiae in Support of PlaintiffsAppellants, supra note 18; Brief of Amicus Curiae Performance Marketing Alliance in
Support of Plaintiffs-Appellants, supra note 93.
156. Quill, 504 U.S. at 316. But see id. at 329-31 (White, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (arguing that the majority's bright-line rule will not achieve its goal of
reducing litigation and criticizing the majority for imposing its own economic preference
under the guise of encouraging settled business expectations).
157. See Baudier, supra note 127, $ 9 ("After Quill, the law appeared settled, but new
technological developments along with the Internet boom have posed new questions for
courts relying on the Quill decision."). Nevertheless, state courts continue to chip away at
the "brightness" of Quill's holding and make the area of Internet taxation all the more
murky. See McGinnis, supra note 34, at 199-200 ("[State courts] have ignored the root
physical presence requirement that is the foundation of the establishment of nexus for
taxation purposes." (citing In re Appeal of Intercard, Inc., 14 P.3d 1111, 1119 (Kan.
2000))).
158. See In re Appeal of Intercard, Inc., 14 P.3d 1111, 1119 (Kan. 2000) ("The Orvis
court ignores the Quill holding that sufficient physical presence is a necessary element of
the nexus required for a state to impose a use tax collection duty.").
159. See Le, supra note 20, at 423. Le also argues that it is "time for Congress ... [to]
take a permanent stance on Internet taxation and provide clear guidance to states and ecommerce businesses." Id.
160. Despite Quill's arguably clear holding, the application of Quill has varied widely
among state courts. See In re Appeal of Intercard,14 P.3d at 1118-23 (summarizing various
state courts' analyses of Quill). The Amazon. corn decision allows for more cutting away at
the bright-line rule. Furthermore, courts are not well-suited to deal with dormant
Commerce Clause issues. See McGinnis, supra note 34, at 201 (explaining that courts only
have the power to invalidate laws which violate the Commerce Clause).
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Development proposes two alternative solutions to help truly settle
the business expectations of Internet retailers: (1) if the Supreme

Court has an opportunity to grant certiorari in Amazon.com or a
similar case, it should do so and reaffirm Quill's bright-line rule with
the caveat that Congress is free to regulate in this area,"' or (2)
Congress should pass uniform, national legislation governing the
imposition of sales and use taxes on Internet retailers.'62
While it is possible the Supreme Court would grant certiorari in a
case addressing the continued strength of Quill, the Quill Court itself

believed that interstate taxation of mail-order companies (or Internet
16 3
retailers) was a matter better resolved in the halls of Congress.
Under dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence, Congress always
remains free to disagree with the Court and "overrule" cases by
passing national legislation." 6 This Recent Development nevertheless
proposes that the Supreme Court should reaffirm Quill's bright-line

test if it has the opportunity to do so, albeit with the caveat that
Congress is free to regulate in this area.'65 This would allow Congress
161. The Supreme Court appears reluctant to address again the issue of Internet
taxation. See Joseph Henchman, Why the Quill Physical Presence Rule Shouldn't Go the
Way of PersonalJurisdiction,46 ST. TAX NOTES 387, 394 (2007) ("The Supreme Court's
decision not to accept the MBNA [America Bank N.A. v. Tax Commissionerof the State of
West Virginia] appeal [in June 2007] suggests that the Court prefers that Congress give the
next word on the physical presence rule after Quill.").
162. For an examination of two possible congressional solutions, see Baudier, supra
note 127,
22-28. The first proposal is for a "single nationwide flat tax on sales
collectible by the state where the goods are used." Id. %22. The second proposal would
leave the taxation power in the hands of the individual states. Id. %24. The states could
participate in the Streamlined Sales Tax Project, which "is endeavoring to develop
computer software which would automatically calculate taxes for any given jurisdiction,
thereby eliminating much of the burden on retailers' crossing multiple states' boundaries."
Id.
163. Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 318 (1992) ("This aspect of our
decision is made easier by the fact that the underlying issue is not only one that Congress
may be better qualified to resolve, but also one that Congress has the ultimate power to
resolve.").
164. Id. For example, after the passage of New York's Amazon tax, New York Senator
Charles Schumer and New York Representatives Anthony Weiner and Gregory Meeks
co-sponsored federal legislation that would have effectively repealed the Amazon tax and
prohibited other states from passing similar taxes. Russell Berman, Amazon Tax Battle
Rages in the Capital: Schumer, Weiner, Meeks Line Up Against Paterson,N.Y. SUN, July
17, 2008, http://www.nysun.com/new-york/schumer-weiner-meeks-side-against-paterson/
82086/.
165. See Henchman, supra note 161, at 392, 395 (noting that Congress is the final
authority over issues of interstate commerce). Several of the Justices, while they likely
would uphold the Quill decision, are hesitant in extending the Court's dormant Commerce
Clause jurisprudence. Thus, it would be wiser for Congress to deal with the situation than
to rely on the Supreme Court changing the decision. See United Haulers Ass'n v. OneidaHerkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550 U.S. 330, 348 (2007) (Scalia, J., concurring in

1446

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 88

to pass legislation, in order to settle officially the expectations of outof-state Internet retailers."6 Ultimately, whether Internet retailers are
allowed to operate freely without paying sales and use taxes or are
forced to collect a national Internet sales tax is a decision better left

to Congress, where retailers
and interest groups are free to lobby
67
1
congressional leaders.

CONCLUSION

The New York trial court's decision in Amazon.com exaggerated
the passive role Amazon's associates play in New York and failed to

give necessary weight to the Supreme Court's decision in Quill. As a
result, Internet retailers across the country now face an uncertain
future. Amazon and other Internet retailers represent the
modernization of the mail-order business in today's technologically
driven society. Thus, the question remains: what rules should courts
apply to these modern day mail-order retailers? The Amazon.com

court, similar to the North Dakota Supreme Court when it upheld the
tax on Quill, 168 decided that Quill's bright-line rule should not be
applied in today's modern society. 6 9 However, the rationales

articulated by the Supreme Court in Quill for maintaining such a
bright-line rule apply with equal force to today's Internet retailers.17 °

part) ("I write separately to reaffirm my view that 'the so-called negative Commerce
Clause is an unjustified judicial invention, not to be expanded beyond its existing
domain.'" (quoting Gen. Motors Corp. v. Tracy, 519 U.S. 278, 312 (1997) (Scalia, J.,
concurring))); Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 610
(1997) (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("The negative Commerce Clause has no basis in the text
of the Constitution, makes little sense, and has proved virtually unworkable in
application."). Furthermore, reaffirmation of Quill and its bright-line rule would prevent
state courts from marginalizing the decision in order to uphold state taxes. See McGinnis,
supra note 34, at 199-200 (discussing the reliance on the faulty reasoning of Orvis as a
means to protect state tax revenues).
166. For an example of a proposed law that would legislatively overrule the substantial
nexus requirement of Quill and likely satisfy the minimum contacts requirement of the
Commerce Clause, see Groves, supra note 5, at 312-13; see also Trahan, supra note 37, at
112, 117-20 (examining the ways in which Congress could change legislatively the physical
presence test, including the passage of a uniform sales and use tax act); Buechler, supra
note 34, at 497-500 (arguing that Congress should take the lead in regulating cyberspace
commerce).
167. See Quill, 504 U.S. at 318-19 ("In this situation, it may be that 'the better part of
both wisdom and valor is to respect the judgment of the other branches of the
Government.' "(quoting Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609, 637 (1981)
(White, J., concurring))).
168. Quill, 504 U.S. at 303-04, 314.
169. Amazon.com v. N.Y. State Dep't of Taxation & Fin., 877 N.Y.S.2d 842, 846-47
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2009).
170. Quill, 504 U.S. at 315-16 (outlining the benefits of a bright-line rule).

2010]

UNCONSTITUTIONAL TAX ON THE INTERNET

1447

It is thus crucial either for the Supreme Court to reaffirm that its
bright-line rule, first articulated in Bellas Hess and reaffirmed in
Quill, remains good law and applies to Internet retailers, or for
Congress to pass uniform, national legislation regulating taxation of
Internet retailers. Without such assurance, the area of Internet
taxation will remain complicated and unclear.
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